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316 HOLBROOK V. BOARD OF EDUCATION [37 C.2d 
[S. F. No. 18263. In Bank. May 25, 1951.] 
C. RAY HOLBROOK, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION OF THE PALO ALTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT et al., Respondents. 
[1] Schools- Teachers and Other Employees- Tenure Law.- A 
school board's assignments of duties to a school employee make 
up the "position or positions" to which the tenure law applies, 
and if all or some of the duties require certification qualifica-
tions, he holds a position requiring such qualifications within 
former Sch. Code, § 5.500, which provided, with certain excep-
tions, that such an employee should be classified as a perma-
nent employee if, after serving three years in· a "position or 
positions" requiring such qualifications, he is reelected to such 
a position. (See Ed. Code, §§ 13081, 13201.) 
[2] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Tenure Law.-Part time 
employment of a school employee in a position requiring certifi-
cation qualifications during the probationary period will re-
sult in the right to permanent employment on a part time basis 
only, and the same result follows where the local board of 
education employs one person in two part time positions involv-
ing substantially different kinds of services, only one of the 
positions being certified. (See Ed. Code, § 13842.) 
[3] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Status.-The relation be-
tween a district board of education and one elected by the 
board to serve as business manager and principal of a high 
school is that of employer and employee, and is created by 
contract. 
[ 4] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Tenure Law.-The tenure 
statutes do not make the relation between a school employee 
and the district board of education any the less one originat-
ing 'in contract, but annex to contracts of employment, when 
repeated for a sufficient number of times, certain legal conse-
quences. 
[5] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Contracts of Employ-
ment.-During the first three years, the status of one employed 
by a district school board is fixed, insofar as permitted by stat-
utes, by the formal contracts, the board's resolutions of ap-
pointment and its rules and regulations. 
[1] Teachers' tenure statutes, notes, 110 A.L.R. 791; 113 A.L.R. 
1495; 127 A.L.R. 1298. See, also, 23 Cal.Jur. 132; 47 Am.Jur. 388. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13] Schools, § 83; [3] 
Schools, § 81; [5-8] Schools, § 88; [11] Schools, § 105(1); [14] 
Schools, § 106 (1). 
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[6] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Contracts of Employ-
ment.-That one elected by a district school board as business 
manager and principal of a high school is employed for one 
full time position rather than two part time positions is evi-
denced by, among other things, the board's resolutions and 
notices indicating the employment to be in a full time position 
as business manager and principal (later business manager and 
director of adult education), the employee's performance of his 
education work and business work as it arose, regardless of 
whether he was then in the board office or at school, and by 
payment of a single, unapportioned salary. 
[7] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Contracts of Employ-
ment.-A business manager and principal (later business man-
ager and director of adult education) of a school is not neces-
sarily employed in two different part time positions merely 
because the employing board's regulations separately list 
duties of business managers and principals, where the regula-
tions do not purport to define a full time position, or indicate 
that employment of one person to handle the duties under both 
headings results in two positions, or define duties relating to 
adult education, and where his duties include administrative 
work not ordinarily pertaining to any specific office. 
[8] Id. -Teachers and Other Employees- Contracts of Employ-
ment.-The appointment of a person as principal of a high 
school subsequent to the election of another as principal and 
business manager does not tend to show that such other had 
been occupying two part time positions, where the district 
supervisor's letter to him shows that the employment contem-
plated direction of adult education and included being princi-
pal, and where the subsequent appointee's testimony indicates 
that he was appointed, not to take over a part time position, 
but to assist such other with adult education work. 
[9] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Tenure Law.-A school 
employee who is elected by a district board of education for 
three consecutive years to a full time position, some of the 
duties of which require certification qualifications, is entitled 
to a permanent full time employment in the district if he is 
reelected for the fourth year to such a position. 
[lOa, lOb] Id.- Teachers and Other Employees- Tenure Law.-
N otwithstanding the fourth year contract of a school district's 
employee, who, for the three previous years, had been elected to 
a full time position carrying duties requiring certification quali-
fications, calls for only one quarter permanent tenure, it is 
ineffective to evade the tenure laws, and, on being reelected for 
the fourth year to a position requiring performance of sub-
stantially the same duties, he is thereafter entitled to full time 
permanent employment in the district. 
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[11] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Mandamus-Evidence. 
-In a mandamus proceeding to compel a district school board 
to reinstate an employee to his prior position and to employ 
him as a full time employee in a position requiring certification 
qualifications of a proper grade, his testimony, as to his protest 
of his fourth year contract as calling for only one quarter 
permanent tenure, is material. 
[12] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Tenure Law.-The fail-
ure of a district school board to classify as a full time perma-
nent employee one who is by law entitled to such classification 
does not prevent him from attaining such status, since the 
classification inures by operation of the statutes. 
[13] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Tenure Law.-Although 
a business manager and director of adult education of a high 
school may in his fourth year become entitled to full time per-
manent employment in the district, in view of Ed. Code, 
§ 13089, it does not follow that he is entitled to continue in 
an administrative position similar to that he held, but he is 
entitled to be classified as a permanent classroom teacher. 
[14] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees--Mandamus to Compel 
Reinstatement.-Mandamus lies to compel a district school 
board to reinstate an employee to his prior position and to 
employ him as a full time employee in a position or positions 
requiring certification qualifications of a proper grade, where 
he establishes that he had been employed in such position or 
positions requiring such qualifications for three consecutive 
years, and that he was reelected to such position or positions 
for the fourth year, and that he is entitled to a full time per-
manent position in the district. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County. M. G. Del Mutolo, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel reinstatement and re-
employment of petitioner to position of business manager of 
a school district. Judgment denying petition reversed with 
directions. 
K. R. McDougall for Appellant. 
Tanner, Odell & Taft, Robert A. Odell, Gardiner Johnson 
and Thomas E. Stanton, Jr., as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Appellant. 
Hardy, Carley & Brenner and John M. Brenner for Re-
spondents. 
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CARTER, J.--This is an appeal on an agreed statement 
from a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate. 
Respondents are the the Board of Education of the Palo Alto 
Unified School District, the individual members of the board, 
and the superintendent of schools of the district. Appellant, 
claiming full-time tenure rights by virtue of his full-time 
employment in the school district for seven consecutive school 
years, seeks to compel respondent board to reinstate him to. 
his prior position and to employ him as a full-time employee 
of the district in a position or positions requiring certification 
qualifications of a proper grade. The board contends that 
appellant has acquired no more than "one-fourth time tenure" 
and the trial court so held. 
At all times pertinent appellant held valid life elementary 
and secondary teachers' credentials and a valid life general 
administrative certificate. On August 1, 1940, respondent 
board adopted a resolution that appellant "be elected Business 
Manager and Principal of the Evening High School to succeed 
Mr. Charles L. Suffield ... and that he serve as other certifi-
cated employees on a probationary basis for three years.'' 
The following day the district superintendent of schools 
addressed a letter to appellant which contained the following: 
''At a special meeting of the Board of Education held on 
August 1st you were on my recommendation elected Business 
Manager and Director of Adult Education, which includes 
being Principal of the Evening High School, to succeed Mr. 
Charles L. Suffield resigned, at a salary at the rate of $3,000 
a year, and your service shall be thought of in the same rela-
tion as other certificated employees who serve under the rules 
of the Board on a three-year probationary basis." 
On August 8, 1940, pursuant to section 5.403 of the School 
Code (now Ed. Code, § 13004), the secretary of the board 
gave written notice to the county superintendent of schools 
that the school district had employed appellant ''to render 
service in a full time position requiring certification qualifi-
cations, in the following capacity: Business Manager and 
Principal of Evening High School-he has been classified by 
this board as a probationary employee.'' 
Appellant testified that he performed the following business 
management duties during the school year 1940-1941: 
Directed the accounting for the school system and the issuing 
of purchase orders and other financial contracts; supervised 
the making of the monthly payroll for all district employees; 
directed the management of the cafeteria; took care of 
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school funds collected through the principals and set up an 
accounting plan concerning such funds; made a continuous 
study of the types of equipment and supplies required in the 
school system, kept inventories thereof and directed the stor-
ing and distribution of such items; took care of the business 
documents and records; directed the work of custodians, 
gardeners and maintenance men and selected persons to do 
. such work; had charge of the school district transportation 
system; helped make the budget and administered it; assisted 
the district superintendent in drafting and revising salary 
schedules and rules and regulations; planned and conducted 
school elections; furnished information to the school em-
ployees and others on matters of school law, salary reduction, 
retirement system, income tax procedures and group insurance 
claims; made claims for reimbursement from the state and 
federal governments for special activities such as child care 
centers, adult education activities, and the cafeteria. 
Appellant also testified that the evening high school pro-
vides classes for adults; that the duties of the principal of that 
school involve scheduling classes for adults, selecting teachers, 
making reports to the state and superintendent, and general 
direction of the adult education program. Holbrook and his 
secretary, Mrs. Young, testified that appellant had to inter-
view prospective teachers. 
The agreed statement recites that appellant was employed 
for the school year 1941-1942 to serve as "Business Manager 
and Principal of the Evening High School." No contracts 
were issued for that year and there were no minutes of the 
board showing his election. He performed the same duties as 
in the first year and also started what was called the National 
Defense Training Center-a program for training adults for 
war production. With another man selected as principal of 
the center, appellant had to do the preliminary organizing 
work, select the teachers, make rules and regulations, and di-
rect the program in general. The center involved from 15 
to 20 teachers and the training of 400 to 500 men every day. 
It was operated 24 hours a day during the war years. 
On May 7, 1942, respondent board adopted a resolution that 
appellant "be employed as Director of Adult Education and 
Business Manager for the school year 1942-1943 at an annual 
salary of $3840.00." Appellant accepted a formal offer of 
employment which was in the following form (italicized por-
tions indicate blank spaces as filled in) : 
"You are hereby notified that at a meeting of the govern-
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i1~g board of Palo Alto Unified School district held May 7, 
full time 
J942, you were elected to serve as a Business Mana-
part time 
ager & Director of Adult Educ. for the school year beginning 
July 1, 1942 and ending June 30, 1943. 
''The following conditions of employment have been stipu-
lated by the governing board and are hereby expressly made 
a part of this contract: . . . 
'' 4. You are hereby classified by this board as a probation-
ary employee, subject to acceptance of this offer." 
Neither the words "full time" nor "·part time," preceding 
the title of the position, was crossed off. The notice of employ-
ment sent to the county superintendent was the same as that 
of August 8, 1940, quoted above. During the year 1942-1943 
appellant served as director of adult education and a Mr. 
Ruppel served as a part time principal of the evening high 
school. Otherwise, Holbrook's duties were the same as in 
the preceding year. Ruppel entered the armed forces in 
November, 1943, and appellant served as principal until Feb-
ruary, 1944. Thereafter a Mr. Stone was principal of the 
evening high school until Ruppel's return on February 1, 
1946. Ruppel testified that he has been a full time principal 
since his return; that appellant, as director of adult educa-
tion, has been his immediate supervisor during all the time 
that he, Ruppel, has been principal. 
Respondent board passed a resolution on May 13, 1943, that 
appellant "be elected to devote three-fourths of his time as 
Business Manager and one-fourth of his time as Director of 
Adult Education for the school year 1943-1944," the fourth 
consecutive year of appellant's employment in the school dis-
trict. The following day the district superintendent sent a 
letter to appellant, stating: 
''At the regular meeting of the Board of Education held 
May 13, 1943, you were elected to serve as an employee of the 
Palo Alto Unified School District for the school year 1943-1944 
in the following capacity-one-fourth time as director of 
adult education, and three-fourths time as business manager. 
The annual salary voted you was $4020.00." 
Appellant's letter of June 3, directed to the board, accepted 
his appointment "in accordance with your notice of May 
37 C.2d-ll 
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14th." Holbrook signed a formal contract on June 5, which 
stated (blanks filled in with italicized words and figures): 
''You are hereby notified that at a meeting of the governing 
board of the Palo Alto Unified School district held May 27, 
fall time 
1943, you were elected to serve as one-fourth time 
paFt time 
as Director of Adult Education-three fourths time as Busi-
ness Manager (non-certificated) for the school year beginning 
July 1, 1943, and ending June 30, 1944. 
''The following conditions of employment have been stipu-
lated by the governing board and are hereby expressly made 
a part of this contract : 
'' 1. Your annual salary for the school year in the above 
named position will be $4200.00 ... 
"4. You are hereby classified by this board as-Three-
fourths time as Business Manager (Non-Certificated)-a per-
manent one-fourth time as Director of Adult Edtteation em-
ployee, subject to acceptance of this offer . . . '' 
A letter from the district superintendent read as follows: 
''Enclosed is your offer of employment for the school year 
1943-1944. Your assignment will be one-fourth time as Di-
rector of Adult Education for which you will be paid $1050.00 
per year, and three-fourths time as Business Manager, for 
which you will be paid $3150.00 per year. This makes a total 
annual salary of $4200.00 ... 
"As Director of Adult Education you are classified as a 
one-fourth time permanent employee. In that the position 
of Business Manager requires no certification, you are em-
ployed three-fourths time as a non-certificated employee." 
Appellant's testimony was that when he received this con-
tract he went to see the district superintendent and told the 
latter that ''the contract was not in harmony with the minutes 
in two respects: first, it says that the meeting was held on 
May 27th, when the meeting was held May 13th; and there 
was no authorization in the minutes for the Board to give me 
a contract that said only one-fourth permanent tenure, that 
I had understood that I had been elected to a full-time perma-
nent position on May 13th . . . and he agreed with me, but 
he said that 'Your argument is that the contract is not im-
portant anyway, if it doesn't agree with the minutes, so why 
fuss about it,' and after discussing it at some length, . . . I 
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concluded, since they were not attempting to remove me 
at that time, to let the matter ride [until] they attempted to 
remove me from my position . . . '' On motion of respondents, 
this testimony was stricken and appellant assigns that ruling 
as error. 
Other testimony by appellant was that in 1943-1944 (the 
fourth year) he performed the same services as in the prior 
year, except that he acted as district superintendent of schools 
in July, 1944, and, in 1943, he began a study of a proposed 
junior college. He also served as principal of the evening 
high school from November, 1943, to February, 1944. 
Appellant's contracts for the following three school years 
(1944 through 1947) recited that he was "elected to serve 
as full time Business Manager (% time)-Director of Adult 
Education ( l;,i time),'' and that he was classified as ''a per-
manent (% time) employee." In these years appellant con-
tinued with the same duties, except that the junior college 
study was finished in the year 1944-1945 and the war train-
ing program was completed in 1945-1946. 
Additional testimony by Holbrook was that he worked at 
the high school plant during the evenings and at the board 
of education office in the daytime; that he could only be 
present at the high school in the evenings, so that he had to 
carry his adult education work over to the board office and 
do a great deal of it over there; that, in a similar manner, 
he would take some business work to the evening school; that 
there was no definite place where he performed any particular 
type of duties. Mrs. Young also testified that, insofar as 
she knew, appellant took care of the various phases of his 
duties as they came up. 
There was no particular conflict in the evidence with re-
spect to appellant's performance of the foregoing duties. Mrs. 
Young and Dr. Almack, a member of respondent board from 
May, 1935, to May, 1945, corroborated appellant's testimony 
to some extent. Dr. Almack testified that administrative em-
ployees did certain acts at the request of the district superin-
tendent, although such services had not been officially ordered 
by the board; that Holbrook performed some services which 
had not been officially authorized in the minutes of the board 
and the board accepted those services. With respect to appel-
lant's claim that he served as acting superintendent and had 
chief responsibility for preparing the school budget, there was 
conflicting testimony. 
AppelJant testified that the printed form on which notices of 
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his employment were given to the county superintendent of 
schools was used for certificated employees. Throughout his 
employment, Holbrook's salary was paid by means of one 
school warrant per month without any indication thereon of 
any apportionment of salary. 
On August 21, 1947, respondent board resolved to discon-
tinue appellant's services as business manager as of Septem-
ber 1, 1947, and to employ him for one-fourth time only to 
direct adult education. Appellant then instituted the pres-
ent proceeding to compel his reinstatement to full time employ-
ment in the district. 
As amended in 1941 ( Stats. 1941, ch. 558, p. 1936), section 
5.500 of the School Code read as follows: 
"Every employee of a school district of any type or class, 
except a joint union or union high school district with an 
average daily attendance of 850 or more, maintaining eight or 
more schools lying not less than six miles apart, who, after 
having been employed by the district for three complete con-
secutive school years in a position or positions requiring cer-
tification qualifications, is reelected for the next succeeding 
school year to a position requiring certification qualifications 
shall, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, at the com-
mencement of said succeeding school year be classified as and 
shall become a permanent employee of the district. . . . '' The 
second paragraph of this section contained the same provision 
with respect to employees of the excepted class of joint union 
or union high school districts. 
The Palo Alto Unified School District has had an average 
daily attendance of more than 850 pupils at all times pertinent 
to this case and it is conceded that appellant's rights are gov-
erned by section 5.500. The Education Code went into effect 
in August, 1943 (Stats. 1943, ch. 71, p. 310), and sections 
13081 and 13082 of that code were substituted for the first 
two paragraphs of section 5.500 of the School Code. 
Other pertinent statutes were: 
Section 5.430 of the School Code (now Ed. Code, § 13034) : 
''No person shall be employed as principal of a school of six 
or more teachers, including the principal, unless he is the 
holder of a valid teacher's certificate and a valid school admin-
istration certificate of the same grade as the school to be ad-
ministered.'' 
Section 5.470 (now Ed. Code, § 13049): "No one shall be 
employed to supervise the work of teachers for more than half 
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time during any school week unless he is the holder of a valid 
teacher's certificate authorizing him to teach in the schools 
and classes in which he is to supervise instruction and a valid 
supervision certificate.'' 
Section 5.471 (now Ed. Code, § 13050): "The holder of a 
valid school administration certificate may supervise general 
instruction in all subjects.'' 
The trial court found that appellant's duties were substan-
tially as claimed by him with certain exceptions; that the 
duties of "the position of Business Manager" were of a kind 
and nature substantially different from the duties of principal 
of the evening high school and those of director of adult 
education. It was found as a fact and· concluded as a matter 
of law that three separate and distinct positions were involved. 
Other findings were that none of appellant's duties as busi-
ness manager required the supervision of the work of teachers, 
nor did such duties require the supervision of general instruc-
tion in all subjects; that some of his duties as director of adult 
education required the supervision of general instruction in 
all subjects; that appellant was required to, and did, devote 
one fourth of his time to the duties of director of adult edu-
cation and three quarters of his time to the duties of business 
manager for the years 1943-1944 through 1946-1947; that he 
is and was able and willing to render full and satisfactory 
service to respondent board in a position or positions requir-
ing certification qualifications. 
It was concluded that none of appellant's duties as business 
manager required certification qualifications; that the posi-
tion of principal of the evening high school did require such 
qualifications; that some of his duties as director of adult 
education required certification qualifications; and that by 
virtue of his employment for one-fourth time as director of 
adult education for the school year 1943-1944, appellant was 
entitled to classification as a permanent one-fourth time em-
ployee of the school district, but he was not entitled to per-
manent full time employment. 
Appellant contends that he held one full-time certificated 
position in the school district, whereas respondents take the 
view that the contrary determination of the trial court is a 
finding of fact which is supported by the evidence and that, 
in any event, the trial court correctly held as a matter of law 
that three separate positions were involved because of the 
different nature of the services required by employment in the 
different capacities. 
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Our attention has not been directed to any decisions or 
statutory provisions dealing with the main question presented 
·in this case. The soundness of the reasoning in the few deci-
sions attempting to define the term ''position or positions re-
quiring certification qualifications,'' as found in former section 
5.500 of the School Code, supra, may be considered somewhat 
questionable in view of the number of statutory amendments 
which have changed the law with respect to the points actually 
decided in such cases. (See note, 24 Cal.L.Rev. 441, 442, 
setting forth the changes effected by the 1935 amendments to 
the School Code with references to prior decisions.) 
In Cullen v. Board of Education (1932), 126 Cal.App. 510 
[15 P.2d 227], the petitioner had been assigned to duty as a 
teacher in day high school classes for eight years and as an 
evening school instructor for six years when he was dismissed 
from the latter function. In compelling his reinstatement, 
it was said (pp. 512-513): "The power of the Board of Edu-
cation to assign its employees to these various duties is not 
questioned and when such assignments have been made they 
must be taken as making up the 'position, or positions' to 
which the Tenure Law applies. 
''Here it is admitted by the demurrer that petitioner served 
as teacher in both day and evening schools for a period of more 
than six years prior to his dismissal, and that his total period 
of service in any one day did not exceed eight hours. We are 
inclined to hold that these assignments constitute but one 
'position' within the meaning of the Tenure Law and that 
petitioner, having served in that 'position' for more than the 
probationary period, has become automatically re-elected to 
that position.'' 
Anderson v. Board of Education (1932), 126 Cal.App. 514 
[15 P.2d 774, 16 P.2d 272], involved similar facts with the 
exception that the petitioner had served as principal of the 
evening school. In reinstating him to that office (and holding 
that he had acquired tenure as such under the provisions of 
the San Francisco charter), the court stated (pp. 520-521) : 
''In this connection we should add that we are not impressed 
with respondents' insistent argument that our judgment 
grants double tenure to these teachers and principals. . . . 
[W] e must interpret the word 'position,' as used in the school 
law and in the charter, as applying to the 'employment' of 
the individual. If they were officers the term 'position' would 
be interpreted with greater strictness as to the term, duties 
and place of employment. But, generally speaking, these 
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factors do not control the relation of master and servant, or 
employer and employee. The latter may be assigned to such 
duties within his employment as the employer may designate. 
Here the employer assigned the employee to teach in two 
separate school buildings and permitted him to continue in 
that service beyond the probationary period and to become 
classified as a permanent employee-not for a part of the 
service only-but for all. The tenure, therefore, runs to a 
position of employment, or service, of equal grade and rank 
to that to which the statutory classification has applied. . . . '' 
In denying a hearing in these cases, this court withheld 
approval from the portion of each opinion "which holds that 
the two employments of petitioner constitute but one posi-
tion." (126 Cal.App. at pp. 513 and 521.) Such a holding 
was unnecessary to the decisions, in that, assuming the peti-
tioners held two part-time positions, they had acquired tenure 
in both capacities and were entitled to permanent full-time 
employment.* 
In Mitchell v. Board of Trustees (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 64 
[ 42 P .2d 397], the petitioner had taught for four hours a 
week in the evening school, in addition to teaching full time 
in the day high school. The trial court entered judgment re-
storing him to his "two positions." It was held that the rein-
statement of the petitioner to his evening school employment 
was error. The court stated (pp. 69-70) : "In effect, the peti-
tioner seems to contend that he acquired one position as a 
teacher in the regular high school and another and different 
position through his work in the evening high school. In 
Cttllen v. Board of Education, supra, the court was inclined 
to hold that teaching part of the time in a day school and part 
of the time in an evening school constituted but one position. 
In drnying a hearing the Supreme Court withheld its approval 
of that proposition. It is unnecessary to decide that qurstion 
here since this petitioner had, in any event, acquired perma-
nent status as a full-time teacher in the day school .... 
"While a permanent status may be acquired throug-h ser-
vice in one or more positions, we think the status when ac-
quired cannot apply or relate to anything in excess of the 
regular and ordinary full-time employment of a teacher. We 
take it that these tenure laws, at most. give to a teacher a 
right to continue in fulJ-time employment without arbitrary 
*For the present provisions with respect to service in hoth day and 
night schools, see section 13086 of the Education Code. 
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dismissal, and that they were not intended to apply to or 
cover any extra work which goes beyond the usual full-time 
employment.'' 
Since Holbrook is not claiming anything more than the 
right to permanent full time employment, the Mitchell case is 
not helpful. 
Former sections 5.710 and 5.711 of the School Code,* which 
authorized the dismissal of permanent employees of a school 
district when that becomes necessary "on account of th~ 
discontinuance of a particular kind of service in such dis-
trict," were considered in Walsh v. Board of Trustees (1934), 
2 Cal.App.2d 180 [37 P.2d 700]. The teacher, a permanent 
employee, had taught vocal music four periods a day in the 
senior high school and the same subject in the junior high 
school for two periods a day. Upon the discontinuance of the 
teaching of vocal music in the senior high school, the petitioner 
contended that he was entitled to full-time work in the junior 
high school in preference to a probationary teacher. In dis-
posing of this contention, the court commented (pp. 182-183) : 
''The main queRtion here is whether the discontinuance of 
teaching vocal music in this senior high school while the 
teaching of the same subject was continued in the junior 
high school is 'a discontinuance of a particular kind of ser-
vice in the district' within the meaning of the statute. A 
closely related question is whether an employment as teacher 
of a certain subject in both a senior high school and a junior 
high school, which has resulted in a permanent status, con-
stitutes one position or two positions within the meaning of 
the School Code.'' In discussing the difference between junior 
and senior high schools, it was said: "[I]t would seem that 
a teaching service in two schools which are totally different in 
kind and nature, should be held to constitute two positions 
rather than one and that the classification statute in question 
was intended to and does cover such a situation." (2 Cal.App. 
2d at p. 184.) (See, also, Unruh v. Piedmont High School 
m.~t., 4 Ca1.App.2d 390, 393 f 41 P.2d 212].) 
Respondents contend that thiR case establishes the rule that 
an employee of a school distriet oceupies two part-time posi-
tions if he is employed to perform two different kinds of ser-
vieeR; that. therefore, the trial court correctly held that appel-
lant's employment involved three different positions and that 
he acquired only part-time tenure. However, it is evident 
*The present statute is section 13651 of the Education Code. 
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that the statements of the court with respect to how many 
positions were present in the Walsh case were dicta; that the 
only question decided was that a particular kind of service 
had been discontinued in the district. Moreover, for reasons 
hereinafter stated, we are not inclined to follow the concept 
expressed in the Walsh opinion-that an employee of a school 
district necessarily holds as many positions as the number of 
kinds· of duties he is required to perform. 
[1] We have concluded that the reasoning set forth in 
Cullen v. Board of Education, supra, is sound.* Former sec-
tion 5.530 of the School Code and the present section 13201 
of the Education Code give school boards the power, and make 
it their duty, ''to fix and prescribe the duties to be performed 
by all persons in public school service in the school district.'' 
Here, respondent board assigned various duties to appellant, 
and, as stated in the Cullen case, supra, page 512, ''when such 
assignments have been made they must be taken as making up 
the 'position, or positions' to which the Tenure Law applies.'' 
If all or some of the duties assigned to an employee require 
certification qualifications, then the employee holds a position 
requiring certification qualifications within the meaning of the 
statute; that is, under the statutory provisions, such a position 
can only be held by a person having the requisite certificate 
or certificates. Neither section 5.530 of the School Code nor 
section 13201 of the Education Code requires the local board 
to assign only certificated duties to any one employee, and 
we are referred to no authority which necessitates a holding 
that, upon reelection for the fourth consecutive school year, 
an employee of a school district becomes entitled to permanent 
status only as to the amount of time devoted to certificated 
duties during the probationary period. At least, under the 
circumstances here, such a conclusion would be administra-
tively impractical, and would, in effect, deprive certificated 
employees of the protection of the tenure laws in cases where 
they are required to perform some services which could have 
been performed by noncertificated employees. To make the 
employee's tenure rights dependent upon the duties assigned 
to him for which a certificate was required, allocated according 
to time, would mean that the employee would attain permanent 
*We are not here concerned with the applicability of that reasoning 
to the particular facts of the Cullen case. Neither do we express any 
opinion as to whether the present provisions of section 13086 of the 
Education Code contemplate part-time or full-time tenure in the Cullen 
and Anderson situations. 
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status on a part-time basis in every case where, in accordance 
with the authority given the local board, he was assigned some 
other duties during his probationary period. Obviously, to 
one who must earn his living from his profession, such part-
time tenure rights would be valueless. In the absence of some 
compelling reason, we cannot assume that the Legislature 
intended such a result. 
That full-time employment normally leads to full-time 
tenure if some of the duties allocated to the school district 
employee require certification is indicated by the cases arising 
prior to the 1935 amendment to section 5.502 of the School 
Code, which dealt with the rights of persons employed both 
as principals and as teachers during the probationary period. 
Prior to 1935, section 5.502 read: "No person employed in an 
administrative or supervisory position requiring certification 
qualifications shall be classified as a permanent employee 
other than as a classroom teacher. . . . '' In construing this 
section and its predecessor, section 1609 of the Political Code, 
it was held that one employed solely as a principal could not 
acquire permanent status (Bland v. Board of Trustees, 67 
Cal.App. 784 [282 P. 395]), but that a person employed to 
serve both as a principal and as a teacher could acquire tenure. 
(Gastineau v. Meyer (1933), 131 Cal.App. 611 [22 P.2d 31]; 
see Klein v. Board of Edttcation (1934), 1 Cal.2d 706 [37 P.2d 
74]; Work v. Central Union H. S. Dist. (1935), 6 Cal.App.2d 
626 [ 44 P .2d 104 7] . ) The following portion of the opinion 
in Gastineau v. 1r!eyer, supra, pp. 615-616, is pertinent here: 
''The language of this statute clearly implies that, while 
one engaged solely in an administrative or supervisory capac-
ity may not be classified as a permanent principal, yet if at 
the same time he also successfully performs the required ser-
vices as a teacher, he is nevertheless entitled to permanent 
tenure 'as a classroom teacher.' ... We are satisfied that 
the law does not authorize permanent classification as a prin-
cipal or supervisor, but that the act does guarantee permanent 
tenure to all other employees, including classroom teachers 
who have been successfully employed by the district for two 
or three complete consecutive school years in positions requir-
ing certification qualifications, in spite of the fact that such 
employee may have been primarily hired as a principal and 
actually devotes a part of his time to the performance of the 
duties of that officer. Since the respondent was qualified as 
a teacher and actually engaged in teaching for the required 
length of time and in strict compliance with the requirements 
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of the statute, he certainly should not be deprived of his 
vested right to permanent tenure as a teacher merely because 
he also performed other services at the same time." (Italics 
added.) 
Apparently it was never thought that such employees could 
be reduced to a part-time status, in proportion to the amount 
of time required to be devoted to teaching activities as con-
trasted with other duties, after attaining classification as 
permanent employees. 
[2] While no authority on the question has been cited, 
we may assume that part-time employment in a position 
requiring certification qualifications during the period of pro-
bation will result in the right to permanent employment on a 
part-time basis only,* and that, with the same result, the local 
board of education may contract to employ one person in two 
part-time positions involving substantially different kinds of 
services, only one of which positions is certified. [3] The 
relationship between respondent board and appellant is that 
of employer and employee and this relationship is created by 
contract. (Gould v. Santa Ana H. S. Dist. (1933), 131 Cal. 
App. 345, 349-350 [21 P.2d 623] .) In Taylor v. Board of 
Education (1939), 31 Cal.App.2d 734, 743 [89 P.2d 148], 
it was said : ''The contract can specify the salary, subject to 
a statutory minimum, the duties to be performed, the number 
of hours per day which the teacher shall perform his services, 
the age and class of students which will be taught, and other 
details relating to actual employment." (See, also, Rible v. 
Hughes, 24 Cal.2d 437, 443 [150 P.2d 455, 154 A.L.R. 137]; 
Richardson v. Board of Education, 6 Cal.2d 583 [58 P.2d 
1285]; Hogsett v. Beverly Hills School Dist .. 11 Cal.App.2d 
328 [53 P .2d 1009] ; Wood v. Los Angeles City School Dist., 
q Cal. A pp.2d 400 [ 44 P .2d 644].) [ 4] The result of the tenure 
statutes "was not to make the relation any the less one origi-
nating in contract, but to annex to contracts of employment 
when repeated for a sufficient time certain legal consequences.'' 
(Abraham v. Sims, 2 Cal.2d 698, 710 [34 P.2d 790, 42 P.2d 
1029] ; see, also, Kacsur v. Board of Trustees, 18 Cal.2d 586, 
591 f116 P.2d 593] .) 
[5] Insofar as permitted by the statutes, the formal con-
tracts, the resolutions appointing appellant, and the rules 
*See section 13842 of the Education Code, prescribing the minimum 
annual salary to be paid each person employed in a full-time or part-
time position requiring certification qualifications and defining ''full 
time.'' 
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and regulations of the board fix the status of appellant during 
the first three years of his employment. (Fry v. Board of 
Education, 17 Cal.2d 753, 760 [112 P.2d 229].) [6] The 
following factors, as detailed above, show that appellant was 
employed in one full-time position, rather than two part-time 
positions: The resolution of August 1, 1940; the letter of the 
district superintendent dated the following day; the notice 
sent to the county superintendent of schools on August 8, 
1940; the reelection of appellant in the same capacity in 1941; 
the resolution, contract, and notice to the county superin-
tendent for the third year; the fact that appellant performed 
his various duties as they came up, without reference to time 
or place, and that this was necessary by the nature of his 
employment; the payment of appellant by a single, unappor-
tioned salary. 
[7] Respondents contend that the fact that the regulations 
of respondent board separately list the duties of business 
managers and principals is evidence upon which the trial 
court could base its conclusion that appellant was employed 
in two different part-time positions during each school year. 
But the regulations do not purport to state what shall consti-
tute a single full-time position and there is no indication that 
the employment of one person to carry out the various duties 
specified under the different headings should make up two 
employments or positions. Also, the fact that the regulations 
do not contain any reference to the duties relating to the 
direction of adult education, and that appellant's activities 
included general administrative work not ordinarily pertain-
ing to any specific office, indicates the fallacy of considering 
a position in terms of a title rather than in terms of a group 
of duties assigned to an employee. 
[8] Neither does the appointment of Ruppel to serve as 
evening school principal, first on a part-time basis in 1942 
and subsequently for full time, tend to show that appellant 
had been occupying two part-time positions. The district 
superintendent's letter of August 2, 1940, informing appel-
lant of his employment, shows that it was intended from the 
beginning that appellant should direct the adult education 
program and that that work should include being principal 
of the evening high school. Ruppel's testimony indicates that 
he was appointed, not to take over a part-time position for-
merly held by appellant, but to assist appellant with the adult 
education work which appellant continued to do. 
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that this 
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eourt is not bound by the trial court's determination that 
appellant held three different positions during the first three 
years of his employment in the district and that that con-
clusion is predicated upon either an erroneous construction 
of the words ''position or positions requiring certification 
qualifications'' as used in section 5.500, or a misconception 
of the terms of appellant's employment as expressed in the 
documentary evidence and the testimony, which is generally 
undisputed, with respect to the duties assigned to, and per-
formed by, appellant. 
[9] Having been elected to a full-time position for three 
consecutive school years, some of the duties of which required 
certification qualifications, appellant is entitled to permanent 
full-time employment in the district if he was reelected for 
the fourth year in a position requiring certification qualifica-
tions. [lOa] Respondents assert that the resolution in May, 
1943, and the contract accepted by appellant for the fourth 
year of his employment (1943-1944), and for succeeding 
years, demonstrates that two part-time positions were in-
volved, at least beginning with the fourth year. We may as-
sume, without deciding, that such a resolution and formal 
contract would have had the asserted effect if they had been 
made during· the probationary period. But appellant and 
the California Teachers Association in an amicus curiae 
brief contend that the form of the fourth year contract was 
adopted as a device to evade the full effect of the tenure laws 
and should be held ineffectual to accomplish that purpose. 
It has been held that resignations of teachers exacted at the 
close of their probationary period as a condition of reemploy-
ment for the next year in the same capacity are not effective 
so as to deny tenure to teachers who in fact continue service 
in the school district. (Sherman v. Board of Tntstees ( 1935), 
9 Cal.App.2d 262 [49 P.2d 350]; Mitchell v. Board of Trustees 
(1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 64, 68 [42 P.2d 397].) The situation 
in the present case is substantially similar. The evidence 
shows that appellant was required to, and did, perform essen-
tially the same services during the fourth year and thereafter 
as in the first three years of his employment. [11] In this 
connection, appellant's testimony to the effect that he pro-
tested concerning the form of his fourth year contract was 
material (Merman v. Calistoga Joint Union H. 8. Dist., 5 Cal. 
2d 438 [55 P.2d 195]), and should not have been stricken. 
[12] The failure of respondent board to classify appellant 
as a full-time permanent employee did not prevent him from 
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attaining that status, for, as stated in La Rue v. Board of 
Trustees, 40 Cal.App.2d 287, at 293 [104 P.2d 689], with 
respect to school districts, such as the one involved here: 
'' [W] hen by the operation of law a teacher is entitled to 
classification as a permanent employee the failure of the 
school board to so classify such teacher does not prevent the 
classification, but the same inures by operation of the stat-
utes." (See, also, La Shells v. Hench, 98 Cal.App. 6, 12-13 
l276 P. 377] .) [lOb] Under the circumstances, we hold that 
appellant was reelected for the year 1943-1944 to a position 
requiring certification qualifications and was thereafter en-
titled to full-time permanent employment in the school dis-
trict. 
This conclusion is not in conflict with Work v. Central 
Union H. S. Dist., supra, 6 Cal.App.2d 626, or Crawford v. 
Board of Education, 20 Cal.App.2d 391 [67 P.2d 348], for in 
those cases the petitioners did not continue doing the same 
work after the expiration of their probationary periods. 
[13] It does not follow, however, that appellant is entitled 
to continue in an administrative position similar to that held 
by him. Section 5.502 of the School Code was amended in 
1935 ( Stats. 1935, ch. 690, § 8, p. 1881) to read as follows: 
'' ... Persons employed in administrative or supervisory 
positions requiring certification qualifications upon completing 
a probationary period, as hereinabove provided, including 
any time served as a classroom teacher if any, in the same 
district, shall, in districts having an average daily attendance 
of 850 or more pupils, be classified as and shall become a per-
manent employee as a classroom teacher .... " This portion 
of section 5.502 is now section 13089 of the Education Code 
with some slight changes in terminology. While the present 
statute makes it clear that a principal or other supervisory 
employee need not perform any teaching services in order to 
be entitled to tenure, there has been no change in the provision 
that such persons become permanent employees as classroom 
teachers after the probationary period is served. (See Griffin 
v. Los Angeles City H. S. Dist. (1942), 53 Cal.App.2d 350 
f127 P.2d 939].) Accordingly, appellant is entitled to be 
classified as a permanent classroom teacher. This does not, 
of course, affect our conclusion that respondent board exceeded 
its authority in purporting to reduce appellant to part-time 
employment. 
The agreed statement recites that the evidence concerning 
the amount of salary due appellant has not been included in 
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the statement for the reason that it is contemplated that, if 
appellant should prevail on this appeal, the case will be re-
manded to the trial court for a determination of that question. 
In .view of this stipulation and the fact that the question has 
not been argued on this appeal, no opinion is expressed on the 
matter of salary. 
[14] The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial 
court to proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, ,J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied June 18, 
1951. 
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[1] Counties-Charters.-If an irregularity in the proceedings by 
local authorities for the adoption of a county charter appears 
on the face of the legislative resolution approving the charter, 
the approval of the Legislature is not conclusive, and the 
court will examine the regularity of the proceedings and 
determine whether or not the constitutional requirements have 
been met and whether the document submitted is a valid 
county charter. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Charters.-Where it appears on the face of a legis-
lative resolution approving a county charter that in five of 
the ten required publications before submission to the elec-
torate a portion of the contents was so garbled as to make 
three sections of the charter unintelligible, there is not such a 
compliance with constitutional requirements as to constitute 
the document a valid charter. 
[3] !d.-Charters.-In view of Const., art. I, § 22, compliance with 
constitutional requirements with regard to adoption of county 
charters (see art. I, § 7Yz), is mandatory and prohibitory. 
[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 418. 
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